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Abstract 
In the paper, we discuss the impact of performing live registry response on the target windows system during loading 
memory acquisition tools. Every running tool on an investigated system leaves artifacts and changes the system state. 
Therefore, we should verify the registry evidences in court exacted from memory invalid or not. Firstly, we measure 
the memory uncertainty in a natural running state (without any other extra tasks) and calculate the blurriness both 
during loading acquisition tools for live forensics. Then, we employ the MemoryAnalyzer which is developed by 
ourselves to extract the registry from the acquired memory. Finally, we analyze and compare keys，subkeys and 
values of the extracted registry hive fives with the original one using Windows Registry File Viewer. Experiments on 
Windows XP Service Pack 2 under VMware® Workstation show that, the memory state are mainly changed by the 
loading acquisition tool although it is also influenced by its natural running. And what's interesting is that the novel 
extracted registry subkeys and values can not be deleted by the live memory acquisition tool, just added some keys 
and values related with acquisition tools in the SYSTEM hive file, and modified key values (usually represent visited 
or running time) in the SOFTWRE and NTUSER.DAT hive files. Therefore, the registry is trustable even that it is 
extracted from acquired memory.
© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of Harbin University 
of Science and Technology 
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1. Introduction 
Traditional or offline forensics involves the recovery of evidence from computer systems that have 
been powered down. Unfortunately, shutting down a system results in the loss of important volatile data. 
Also, it may not be possible to shut down vital enterprise systems to conduct forensic investigations[1]. 
Compared with the risk and drawback for the traditional computer forensics on disk, live memory 
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forensics is a more reliable scheme.The digital forensics community feels the urge to rapidly develop 
tools and techniques for capturing and analyzing physical memory content. This is motivated by the fact 
that physical memory may contain evidence that may not be found in any other source of digital evidence. 
The expected techniques will facilitate the investigation and analysis process and allow to reach more 
reliable conclusions [2]. 
The live memory has many valid evidences or forensic sensitive information [3,4], and many 
researchers has developed techniques for extracting invalid information, such as registry command lines[5] 
and registry keys and values [6-10]. The Windows registry stores a wide variety of information, including 
core system configurations, user-specific configuration, information on installed applications, and user 
credentials. The Windows registry serves as a primary storage location for system configurations and as 
such provides a wealth of information to investigators. This makes the Windows registry a critical 
resource for digital forensic investigations conducted against the Windows platform. Numerous 
researchers have workedto interpret the information stored in the registry from a digital forensic 
standpoint. Vivienne Mee et al [6] examined the use of the Windows Registry as a source of forensic 
evidence in digital investigations, especially related to Internet usage. Brendan Dolan-Gavitt[7], presented 
tools and techniques that can be used to extract this data directly from memory dumps. Timothy D. 
Morgan[8] explored this topic and provides an algorithm for recovering deleted keys, values, and other 
structures in the context of the registry as a whole. Zhang et al [9] proposed an extracting the hive files 
from memory algorithm, which could be used in all various windows versions, such as Window XP, 
Windows Vista and Windows 7. Harjinder Singh Lallie eta l [10] showed that BitTorrent client programs 
produce registry artefacts that can contain information that might be used as evidence during an 
investigation.
All the above previous research works have focused on the how to exact the registry hive files and 
analyze the registry as evidence resources. However, there is a basic and important problem which can 
not be ignored in the live forensics field, that is, volatile information in computer memory is ephemeral 
by definition and can be altered as a consequence of the live forensic approach.. Therefore, in our paper, 
we compare different registry hive files to verify the trustable of the acquired memory.The rest of the 
paper is organized as below. Section 2 of this paper provides an overview of the related works and 
Section 3 describes the registry hive files and their structures in the memory. Some experiments are made 
to show the evidence is trust during exacted in the memory with different acquisition tools. Then, the 
experimental results are discussed in section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
2. The registry hive files and their structures 
Fig. 1 Structure of the Windows Registry
Here, we briefly provide an overview of the internal data structures of the registry. Information on the 
specific layouts of each structure may be found in Morgan [11]. The Windows registry is organized in a 
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tree structure and is analogous to a filesystem, as illustrated in Fig.1.For instance, registry values are 
similar to files in a filesystem as they store name and type information for discrete portions of raw data. 
Registry keys are closely analogous to filesystem directories, acting as parent nodes for both subkeys and 
values. Finally, individual registry files (or ‘‘hives’’) are presented to users in Windows under a set of 
virtual top-level keys. The windows registry is a hierarchical database used in windows family of 
operating systems to store information that is necessary to configure the system. It is used by Windows 
applications and the Operating System itself to store all sorts of information, from simple configuration 
data to sensitive data such as account passwords and encryption keys. Researchers have found that the 
registry can also be important source of forensic evidence when examining Windows systems[7]. 
  In typical Windows XP SP2 memory images, we found 13 hives: the NTUSER and UsrClass hives 
for the currently logged on user, the LocalService user, and the NetworkService user (total of six hives); 
the template user hive(“default”); the Security Account Manager hive (“SAM”); the system hive; the 
Security Hive; and finally, two volatile hives that have non on-disk representation. The two volatile hives 
deserve some special mention: one, the HARDWARE hive, is generated at boot and provides information 
on the hardware detected in the system. The other, the registry hive, contains only two keys, MACHINE 
and USER, which are used to provide a unified namespace in which to attach all other hives. 
HKU (HKEY_USER) contains per-user (user-specific) information. HKU contains at least these 3 
subkeys:
- .DEFAULT 
- SID, SID is the security identifier for console user (user currently using the keyboard). 
- SID_CLASSES contains per-user class registration and file association. 
HKU has other well-known SID in Windows XP. 
- S-1-5-18 refers to LocalSystem account. 
- S-1-5-19 refers to LocalService account. It is used to run local services that do not require 
LocalSystem account. 
- S-1-5-20 refers to NetworkService account. It is used to run network services that do not require 
LocalSystem account. 
Any other subkeys in HKU are associated to secondary users. Windows XP has a feature called 
Secondary Logon, which allows user to run a program as a different user, usually with elevated privileged. 
Thus, user can logon to a limited account for daily routines and uses elevated privileged for occasional 
administrative task. The secondary user SID (usually administrative account SID) will only present in the 
HKU subkeys if the user performs a secondary logon during the user’s session. If an offender performs a 
secondary logon on any other accounts, the secondary user subkey will exist in HKU until secondary user 
logoff, or the program running in the elevated privileged is closed. Table 1 shows registry path and their 
corresponding hives on disk. All hives in HKLM are stored in % SYSTEMROOT%\system32\config(% 
SYSTEMROOT% usually refers to C:\WINDOWS). HKLM\HARDWARE is a dynamic hive that is 
created each time the system roots and it is created and managed entirely in memory. HKU\.DEFAULT 
hive file correspond to %SYSTEMROOT%\System32\config\default. HKU\SID hive file is stored in user 
home directory, which is %USERPROFILE%\NTUSER.DAT, while HKU\SID_CLASSES hive file 
correspond to %USERPROFILE%\Local Settings \Application Data\Microsoft\Windows\UsrClass.dat. 
That is, we can easily use these registry hive files (such as Default, SAM, Security, Software, 
NTUSER.DAT, UsrClass.dat) to analyze the keys of registry. 
3. Experiments and discussions 
In order to make clear that what the memory content changes with the machine running, what 
degree the memory content is modified during the acquired process and how the modified memory affect 
the registry hive files, we make some experiments. Our experiments were performed using a Windows 
XP Service Pack 2 VMware® Workstation 7.1.4 build-385536 on a Windows 7 host. The host OS is 
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Windows 7 Ultimate, 32-bit (Build 7600) 6.1.7600, with 3G RAM. We tested the following four 
experiments under the above environment. We have made four tests to learn through about the Effect of 
Live memory Acquisition tools on the trust of registry. The live response toolkit used in our experiments 
is the user_load.exe, which is developed by ourselves and based on the absolute driver file 
(MemDump.sys). The acquired tool does not depend on possible modified driver system files or dlls in 
the original operating system, which makes the acquired memory trusted[12]. We use Windows Registry 
File Viewer[13] to analyze the registry hive files. 
In order to make clearly which registry keys and values are modified during capturing the memory, 
we use the Windows Registry File Viewer to open the hive files and save them as text files. The 
UltraCompare tools are employed to obtain the different registry subkeys and values. In the following, we 
uncover the keys and values in detail. 
(a) Adminstrator\ NTUSER.DAT
  The only one different key is 
[\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\UserAssist\{75048700-EF1F-11D0-9888-
006097DEACF9}\Count] 
Four subkeys’ values are different in total. We show them in detail as follows. 
NTUSER.DAT extracted from the snapshot memory 
z HRZR_HVFPHG"=hex(3):1E,00,00,00,97,02,00,00,50,55,52,A0,B8,4A,CC,01 
z HRZR_EHACNGU"=hex(3):1E,00,00,00,78,06,00,00,60,51,E7,0B,CA,4A,CC,01 
z HRZR_EHACNGU:(ahyy)"=hex(3):1E,00,00,00,86,00,00,00,E0,8E,AE,43,AE,4A,CC,01 
z HRZR_EHACNGU: 
grfg_hfre_ybnq.ong.yax"=hex(3):1E,00,00,00,06,00,00,00,90,6F,69,43,AE,4A,CC,01 
NTUSER.DAT extracted using acquired tool  
z HRZR_HVFPHG"=hex(3):1E,00,00,00,98,02,00,00,90,49,38,3D,CA,4A,CC,01 
z HRZR_EHACNGU"=hex(3):1E,00,00,00,7A,06,00,00,30,6F,5E,3D,CA,4A,CC,01 
z HRZR_EHACNGU:(ahyy)"=hex(3):1E,00,00,00,87,00,00,00,30,6F,5E,3D,CA,4A,CC,01 
z HRZR_EHACNGU: 
grfg_hfre_ybnq.ong.yax"=hex(3):1E,00,00,00,07,00,00,00,90,49,38,3D,CA,4A,CC,01 
The UserAssist Key, HCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Currentversion\Explorer\UserAssist, 
contains two or more subbkeys which we have long hexadecimal names that appear as globally unique 
identifiers (GUIDs). Each subbkey records values that pertain to specific objects the user has accessed on 
the system, such as Control Panel applets, shortcut files, programs, etc. These values however, are 
encoded using a ROT-13 encryption algorithm, sometimes known as a Caesar cipher. We decrypt the 
keys and key value using UserAssist_V2_4_3 (http://blog.didierstevens.com/programs/userassist/), as 
follows: 
z "UEME_UISCUT","","30","658","2011/7/25 18:50:11","2011/7/25 10:50:11" 
z "UEME_RUNPATH","","30","1651","2011/7/25 20:54:53","2011/7/25 12:54:53" 
z "UEME_RUNPATH:(null)","","30","129","2011/7/25 17:36:00","2011/7/25 09:36:00" 
z "UEME_RUNPATH:  
z test_user_load.bat.lnk","","30","1","2011/7/25 17:36:00","2011/7/25 09:36:00" 
And 
z "UEME_RUNPATH","","30","1653","2011/7/25 20:56:16","2011/7/25 12:56:16" 
z "UEME_RUNPATH","","30","1653","2011/7/25 20:56:16","2011/7/25 12:56:16" 
z "UEME_RUNPATH:(null)","","30","130","2011/7/25 20:56:16","2011/7/25 12:56:16" 
z "UEME_RUNPATH:  
z test_user_load.bat.lnk","","30","2","2011/7/25 20:56:15","2011/7/25 12:56:15" 
 For Adminstrator\Ntuser.DAT registry hive file, the registry time key values were modified by the 
running memory acquired tool user_load.exe. These time values also give the when to capture the 
operating system memory.  
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(b) SOFTWARE 
The only one different key value is [\Microsoft\Cryptography\RNG]
Extracted from the snapshot memory 
z "Seed"=hex(3):9C,F2,D5,C7,F4,78,18,6D,9F,79,34,E7,5A,CA,06,B6,CB,86,84,1C,91,1C,1F,3
0,1E,F5,51,A7,B3,98,F0,EA,D0,A2,B1,D2,BC,AC,0D,8F,4C,A7,F4,93,AE,7F,05,F9,B6,5D,E
D,3A,92,8F,0B,8D,5E,64,54,A2,50,5F,D9,83,53,38,8E,F7,61,A2,5B,25,D7,E4,DF,D0,23,EB,0
B,EE
Extracted using acquired tool  
z "Seed"=hex(3):96,0A,DF,13,E1,1D,FF,62,8D,56,C2,DE,D6,01,83,A6,52,85,95,80,1D,14,DE,
EC,95,76,7E,E8,2B,65,86,B3,3D,BF,59,58,DF,93,C3,51,77,2F,FC,61,C6,87,2C,2F,98,B0,AD
,F4,D7,AD,C9,3D,64,41,DA,28,01,F8,C4,BD,66,89,B8,D4,21,CD,1A,00,62,98,1B,1D,98,04,
39,E2 
For software registry hive file, Basicly WinXP keeps a running PRNG seed around for it's CryptoAPI. 
This CryptoAPI is just a service Windows provides for programmers (those I've yet to see a program that 
uses it other than Windows itself). Windows's CryptoAPI uses the binary registry 
key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography\RNG\Seed to store a seeded value 
from all of its entropy sources. CryptoAPI is intended for use by developers of Windows-based 
applications that will enable users to create and exchange documents and other data in a secure 
environment, especially over nonsecure media such as the Internet. Developers should be familiar with 
the C and C++ programming languages and the Windows programming environment. Although not 
required, an understanding of cryptography or security-related subjects is advised. 
(c) SYSTEM 
There is one key value which is modified, as follows: 
[\ControlSet001\Control\Session Manager\AppCompatibility] 
This key value is very large, Fig.4 only shows part of them to save space. 
                  Fig.2 Part of different key AppCompatCache value 
And three subkeys and their corresponding values related with the memory acquired tool 
user_load.exe and the drive memdump.sys and its configuration in the system registry hive file.  
[\ControlSet002\Enum\Root\LEGACY_MEMDUMP] 
¾ "NextInstance"=dword:00000001 
[\ControlSet002\Enum\Root\LEGACY_MEMDUMP\0000]
¾ "Service"="MemDump" 
¾ "Legacy"=dword:00000001 
¾ "ConfigFlags"=dword:00000000 
¾ "Class"="LegacyDriver" 
¾ "ClassGUID"="{8ECC055D-047F-11D1-A537-0000F8753ED1}" 
¾ "DeviceDesc"="MemDump" 
[\ControlSet002\Services\MemDump] 
¾ "Type"=dword:00000001 
¾ "Start"=dword:00000002 
¾ "ErrorControl"=dword:00000001 
¾ "ImagePath"="\\??\\E:\\memory acquisition tool\\32 bit\\MemDump.sys" 
¾ "DisplayName"="MemDump" 
From the above discussions, we can make a conclusion that the novel extracted registry subkeys 
and values can not be deleted by the live memory acquisition tool, just added some keys and values 
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related with acquisition tools in volatile memory, and modified the regkey values related with time(such 
as \Microsoft\Cryptography\RNG ), that is, the registry is trustable even that it is extracted from acquired 
memory. 
4. Conclusions 
In this paper, we investigate the trustable of registry evidence extracted from the acquired memory. 
Firstly we measure the uncertainty of memory content in a natural way without running other application 
software. Also, we investigated the modified ratio of memory content for loading acquired tool. Finally, 
we analyze the changes of registry hive files. The added registry keys and values are related with loading 
and running acquired tool. The software and hardware in the system configurations information are not 
modified. The security policy and profile are also not modified. That is, the registry is trustable even that 
it is extracted from acquired memory. 
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